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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(j)(Rep.Vol. 9 2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court below err in imposing a constructive trust in the absence of a

finding or any evidence that the grantor and grantees of the subject property were in a
confidential relationship? In an equity proceeding, appellate courts do not engage in a
review of the evidence which duplicates the task of the trial court. Rather, it assesses the
quality and quantity of the evidence to determine whether it clearly preponderates against
the trial court's finding that the appropriate standard of proof has been satisfied. A
determination by the appellate court that the evidence clearly preponderates against a trial
court's finding requires a smaller quantum of contrary evidence, and a less stringent
appraisal of its quality, when the trial court's finding is based upon a clear and convincing
standard, rather than a preponderance of the evidence standard. In re Estate of Hock, 655
P . 2 d l l l l , 1115n.l (Utah 1982).
Issue preserved throughout trial.
2.

Was there sufficient evidence presented below to warrant the imposition of

a constructive trust? In an equity proceeding, appellate courts do not engage in a review
of the evidence which duplicates the task of the trial court. Rather, it assesses the quality
and quantity of the evidence to determine whether it clearly preponderates against the trial
-1-

court's finding that the appropriate standard of proof has been satisfied. A determination
by the appellate court that the evidence clearly preponderates against a trial court's
finding requires a smaller quantum of contrary evidence, and a less stringent appraisal of
its quality, when the trial court's finding is based upon a clear ^nd convincing standard,
rather than a preponderance of the evidence standard. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d
1111, 1115n.l(1982).
Issue preserved throughout trial.
3.

Did the Court below err in failing to find that the claim for a constructive

trust was barred by the statute of limitations? Whether a statute of limitations has expired
is a question of law that appellate courts review for correctness giving no particular
deference to the lower court. Spears v. Warn 2002 UT 24.
Issue preserved at R. 534.
4.

Did the Court below err in imposing sanctions oi^ the plaintiffs for failure to

participate in a court ordered mediation in good faith? Sanction orders are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App. 152.
Issue preserved at R. 1313.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The order of the Court below which is the subject of this appeal is the imposition
of a constructive trust upon real property in favor of Arnold D^vayne Rawlings
("Dwayne"), Paulette Rawlings, Theron LaRell Rawlings ("LaRell"), Bryce C. Rawlings
-2-

and Carol Lynn R. Masterson (collectively known as the third party plaintiffs). The third
party plaintiffs alleged that a 1967 warranty deed executed in favor of Donald Rawlings
and Jeanette Rawlings by Arnold Rawlings and his wife, Cleo Rawlings, was intended to
convey property in trust for the benefit of Cleo Rawlings and all of her children, including
the third party plaintiffs. The issue was tried to the Court in a four day bench trial from
March 12, 2007 through March 15, 2007. The court entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order certifying its order as a final judgment, pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on August 24, 2007.
Notice of Appeal was filed on September 4, 2007.
On March 24, 1967, Arnold Rawlings and his wife, Cleo Rawlings, executed a
warranty deed in favor of their son, Donald Rawlings, and his wife, Jeanette Rawlings,
for the property which is the subject of this appeal. On that same day, each of Arnold and
Cleo's other children (and Dwayne Rawlings' spouse, Paulette) executed quit claim deeds
for this same property in favor of Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings. (R. 1449,
Exhibits 12 and 13).
While the warranty deed was absolute on its face, two of the third party plaintiffs
testified that their father told them that the property was being deed to Donald to avoid
having the property being taken by the welfare department, which was paying for
Arnold's cancer treatment. LaRell Rawlings testified that his father offered to give him
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the property outright, but ultimately decided to deed it to Donald "to take care of mother,
and then us, after she passed away." (R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, at p. 50).
Dwayne Rawlings testified that on approximately March 22, 1967, his father "just
said that they were going to put it in Donald's name, and that he had to get it out of his
name. They were going to put it in Donald's name, and it would be held for the family."
(R. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, p. 381.) The other two Rawlings children admitted that their
father never told them anything about the property being held ih trust. (R. 1451, Trans.
Vol. II, pp. 257-58; 307.)
Carol Masterson admitted that her mother, Cleo, always insisted that the property
was deeded to Donald and Jeanette because they had paid off the mortgage on the
property.
Q.

A.

But every time that that question came up, your mother
consistently said that the property was deeded to
Donald and Jeanette because they paid off the
mortgage; isn't that true?
That's true.

(R. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, p. 308.)
LaRell Rawlings admitted as much as well. Talking about his mother, LaRell testified as
follows:
Q.

A.

And the story she told was that the property was
deeded to Donald and Jeanette because they paid off
the mortgage?
Correct.

-4-

(R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 148.)
Bryce Rawlings concurred.
Q.

My question is really, that your mother has told you,
has she not, that the reason the property was deeded to
Donald and Jeanette was because they paid off the
mortgage?

A.

That's what she always said.

(R. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, pp. 263-64.)
The evidence presented regarding payment of the mortgage was that Arnold
Rawlings approached Donald Rawlings in approximately April of 1966 about needing
money to make mortgage payments to Walker Bank. Donald testified that he gave his
father money a couple of times and when his father asked a third time, Donald went to the
bank to talk to an employee about his father's loan. (R.1459, Trans. Vol. HI, pp. 535-36.)
Jeanette Rawlings testified that thereafter she made 7 payments on the mortgage (Fxhibits
72 through 78) concluding with a $579.06 payment on December 29, 1966, at which time
she received a deed of reconveyance from the bank. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, pp. 61113; Exhibit 51.)
In addition to these payments, Jeanette Rawlings testified that on March 24, 1967,
she paid $1,267.00 to take care of back taxes, of which she received reimbursement of
$500.00 from Dwayne Rawlings (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. HI, p. 614). Dwayne Rawlings
testified that he gave her $1,000.00. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, p. 418.)
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By 1974, a controversy had developed regarding the Vineyard Meadows
subdivision which had been developed on the southern border of the subject property
Donald Rawlings asked each of the third party plaintiffs to sign a second quit claim deed,
with a corrected property description, to assist him in litigation with lot owners who he
alleged were encroaching on the subject property. Each did so. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill,
p. 556.) This litigation resulted in the recovery by Donald of approximately $52,000.00,
(R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, p. 585).
In 1978 Donald and Jeanette Rawlings deeded one of the lots from the subject
property to Dwayne and Paulette and themselves in joint tenancy. This lot was used as
partial consideration for a different lot on which Donald and Dwayne operated a business
for a number of years. (R. 1459, Trans. Vol. Ill, pp. 449-52.) None of the other third
party plaintiffs received any interest in this property or the business operated thereon.
In addition to the evidence of conversations between D^vayne and LaReli with
their father, third party plaintiffs believe their claim was supported by evidence that
Arnold Rawlings continued to use and refer to the property as Jiis own even after 1967
(Exhibits 19 through 29); that each of the third party plaintiffs continued to have access to
the property to pick fruit for their mother's benefit; and that Donald told Dwayne that the
execution of the 1974 quit claim deeds was necessary to protect "mother's farm."
Donald and Jeanette Rawlings acknowledge that such evidence was admitted at
trial, but deny such facts give rise to any inference which supports their claim.
-6-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Third party plaintiffs presented no evidence of the existence of a confidential
relationship between the grantor and the grantees of the subject warranty deed, and the
court below made no finding of such a relationship, which is required by Utah law as a
predicate for the imposition of a constructive trust.
The evidence offered by the third party plaintiffs was insufficient, as a matter of
law, to sustain their burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that a deed
absolute on its face was intended as a conveyance in trust. Our Supreme Court has held
that the unsubstantiated claims of purported beneficiaries of a trust cannot meet the
evidentiary burden imposed by Utah law.
The third party plaintiffs were on notice as of 1980 that Donald Rawlings was
treating the subject property as his own, and inconsistently with the existence of a trust
relationship. Accordingly, the third party plaintiffs' claim was long since barred by the
statute of limitations.
The Court below abused its discretion by imposing sanctions on Donald and
Jeanette Rawlings for asserted bad faith in a mediation. They attended the mediation, as
ordered, and had no obligation to make settlement proposals at such mediation. The
failure to do so cannot subject them to sanctions.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO OFFER ANY
EVIDENCE THAT A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
EXISTED BETWEEN THE GRANTOR AND GRANTEES.

The Court ordered the imposition of a constructive trust despite the complete
absence of any finding or any evidence that a confidential relationship existed between
Arnold Rawlings and Donald and Jeanette Rawlings, as requirpd by Utah law. In Ashton
v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), our Supreme Court expressly adopted the position
expressed in Restatement 2d, Trusts §45, which provides as follows:
Effect of Failure of Oral Trust for a Third Person
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter
vivos to another in trust for a third person, but n^)
memorandum properly evidencing the intention to create a
trust is signed, as required by the Statute of Frauds, and the
transferee refuses to perform the trust, the transferee holds the
interest in trust for the third person, if, but only if,
(b) the transferee at the time of the transfer was
in a confidential relation to the transferor.
(emphasis added).
As noted by Utah's Supreme Court, in Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 511 (Utah
1976), before a trial court may properly impose a constructive trust consistently with
§45(b) of the Restatement, the court would have to find, by clear and convincing
evidence,
that the defendants at the time of the transfer of the property
to them by plaintiffs .. . orally agreed to hold said lots in trust
-8-

for [plaintiffs] and were in a confidential relationship to the
plaintiffs.
558P.2dat513.
As there was no evidence offered that Donald and Jeanette Rawlings agreed to
hold the property in trust or that they were in a confidential relationship with Arnold
Rawlings, there was no basis for the Court to impose a constructive trust. The only
evidence relating to Donald's relationship with his father came from LaRell, who testified
that their relationship was not close (R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, p. 140).
While the third party plaintiffs asserted below that the fact that Arnold was
Donald's father meant that they were in a confidential relationship, such is not Utah law.
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Froyd v. Barnhurst, 28 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah
1934), "the mere relationship of parent and child does not constitute evidence of...
confidential relationship . . ."
This principle was further expressed by the Court in Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401
P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965), wherein the Court noted, in reversing the trial court, that the
mere relationship of parent and child does not constitute
evidence of such confidential relationship as to create a
presumption of fraud or undue influence. While kinship may
be a factor in determining the existence of a legally significant
confidential relationship, there must be a showing, in addition
to the kinship, [of] a reposal of confidence by one party and
the resulting superiority and influence on the other party.
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This showing is absent in the present case. Accordingly, the rule set forth in the
Restatement has no application to this matter. As noted in Froyd, supra, the
[o]wner of property has a right to dispose of it during his
lifetime as he sees fit, even though his act may, in itself, seem
to be unfair and unreasonable with reference to the interest of
other children than the one to whom the conveyance is made.
28 P.2d at 137 [quoting Hatch v. Hatch. 148 P. 433 (Utah 1914|)].
POINT II.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OFFERED TO
MEET THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' BURDEN OF PROOF.

The second reason that the third party plaintiffs can't succeed on a constructive
trust theory is because Utah law requires that in order to establish that a deed which is
absolute on its face was intended to be a conveyance in trust, a party must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that such was the grantor's intent. If the only evidence
purporting to establish such intent is the self-serving testimony of the purported
beneficiaries of the alleged trust, the claim fails as a matter of law. In Jewell v. Horner,
366 P.2d 594 (Utah 1961), the plaintiffs sought to impose a constructive trust on property
their father had deeded to their sister, claiming that the conveyance was intended to be in
trust for the benefit of all the children. The trial court had imposed a constructive trust
and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the testimony of
the plaintiffs regarding their father's alleged intent failed as a rtiatter of law to meet the
burden of proof required to impose a constructive trust. The Court noted that

-10-

to justify a Court in determining from oral testimony that a
deed which purports to convey land absolutely in fee simple
was intended to be something different, such as a trust, such
testimony must be clear and convincing. That proof must be
something more than a modicum of evidence which this Court
sometimes holds to be sufficient to warrant a finding where
the matter is not so serious as the overthrow of a clearlyexpressed deed, solemnly executed and delivered.
366 P.2d at 597.
The Court held that the self-serving testimony of the alleged beneficiaries, coupled
with ambiguous testimony of third parties, could not meet this rigorous standard.
Drawing on prior Utah authority, the Court reiterated that
the proof must be strong, clear, and convincing, such as to
leave no doubt of the existence of the trust. Such a case is
similar to one where it is attempted to convert a deed absolute
on its face into a mortgage, or where the reformation of a
written instrument is sought on the ground of accident,
mistake, or fraud. In all such cases the court will scrutinize
parol evidence with great caution, and the plaintiff must fail
unless it is clear, definite, unequivocal, and conclusive.
Public policy, and the safety and security of titles to real
estate, demand this rule, because such evidence is offered to
overcome the strong presumption, arising from the terms and
conditions of an instrument in writing, which is always the
best evidence of title. If it were once established that the
effect of a written instrument could be avoided by a bare
preponderance of parol evidence, the gates to perjury would
soon be wide open, and no person could longer rest in the
security of his title to property, however solemn might be the
instrument on which it was founded.
366 P.2d at 597-98.
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The Court also restated the obvious problems associated with the unsubstantiated
testimony of the alleged beneficiaries, whose testimony is
so capable of inaccuracy, so susceptible of fabrication, so
impossible of contradiction, where the person alleged to have
made the admission is dead.
Id. at 598.
In the instant case there is no third-party testimony that supports the claims of the
third-party plaintiffs. In fact, the clear thrust of the evidence i$ to the contrary. Their
mother, the wife of the grantor, has repeatedly stated that the property was deeded to
Donald because he paid off the mortgage. At the same time as this deed was granted, the
third-party plaintiffs quit claimed any interest in the very property they now seek. The
deed was prepared by a lawyer. "Had the father intended his spns to have an interest in
the property, it would have been a simple matter for the attorney to have so provided in
the deed." Id.
While the trial court apparently was not convinced that Donald and Jeanette
Rawiings paid off the mortgage (though there was no evidence that they didn't), this is of
no significance because they had no burden to prove anything. Arnold Rawiings was free
to give them the property if he so chose.

-12-

POINT III.

THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM WAS BARRFD BY
LIMITATIONS.

In approximately 1973, a dispute arose between Donald Rawlings and lot owners
in the Vineyard Meadows subdivision over whether those lot owners were encroaching on
the property of Donald and Jeanette Rawlings. In January of 1974, each of the third party
plaintiffs signed a second quit claim deed to Donald and Jeannette Rawlings, with a
corrected property description. Donald Rawlings commenced litigation against the
property owners. The lawsuits ultimately resulted in settlements with payment of
approximately $52,000.00 in exchange for deeds from Donald and Jeanette to the lot
owners of the disputed ground. Donald gave Dwayne $600.00 of the proceeds, Carol and
Bryce $500.00 and tendered $500.00 to LaRell, who refused it. He also paid $10,000.00
to his mother. This occurred in January of 1980. As of that date, each of the third party
plaintiffs was on notice that Donald was not treating the property as trust property but was
dealing with it as he saw fit. Accordingly, the third party plaintiffs' claim expired, at the
latest, in 1984.
Under Utah law, a claim for breach of an alleged trust is four years. See Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-25 (Rep. Vol. 9 2002). This statute begins to run when the alleged
"beneficiary knows or through reasonable investigation could have learned of a breach or
repudiation." Snow v. Rudd. 998 P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 2000).

-13-

When the third party plaintiffs became aware that Donald had conve)
subject property without their consent and without making an equitable distribution of the
proceeds from that sale, they were clearly on notice that he was repudiating any alleged
duty he had to hold the property in trust. LaRell Rawlings has admitted as much.
LaRell testified that he thought he should have receive^ his proportionate share of
the proceeds of the sale of the property.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Okay. So if [Donald] got a lot of money for the
property, you felt you were entitled to your share of the
money?
If there was money, I figured it would have been fair,
if it was going to be disbursed at that time, from that
lawsuit, I would have thought it would h^ve been a fair
amount.
Did you - - a fair amount being your proportionate
share?
Yes.

Q.

Were you concerned that some of the property in
which you thought you had an interest was being used
in a manner that was not beneficial to you?

A.

I thought that, yes.

(R. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, pp. 162, 166.)
In Snow, supra, the Court emphasized that the plaintiffs lack of reasonable inquiry
in the face of knowledge that the property in which she had an interest had been sold
precluded her from asserting that her cause of action didn't accrue until she had actual
knowledge of the terms of a trust.
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[Tjhere can be no doubt that, as a matter of law, she had
knowledge as of 1985 of all facts necessary to put her on
notice to inquire as to whether the sale of the house to her
sister breached the trust. She knew nothing in 1993 she did
know in 1985 .. .
998 P.2d 262 (Utah 2000).
Once placed on inquiry notice, an alleged beneficiary of a trust cannot avoid that
statute of limitation by simply asserting that the statute is tolled because the alleged
trustee stands in a fiduciary relationship with the beneficiary. As stated by the Colorado
Supreme Court,
An action on any trust accrues at such time as the claimant
attains, or reasonably could have attained, notice of the
trustee's use of the property in a manner which is inconsistent
with the claimant's interest.
Lucas v. Abbott. 601 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Colo. 1979).
Third party plaintiffs had such notice in 1980 and their purported cause of action
accrued at that time.
POINT IV.

THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
IMPOSING SANCTIONS.

The trial court imposed sanctions on Donald and Jeanette Rawlings for what was
characterized as their bad faith in connection with a court ordered mediation. It is
undisputed that they, in fact, attended the mediation. While Rule 101(h) authorizes a
court to order parties who fail to attend mediation to show cause why they failed to attend
and, if appropriate, why sanctions should not be imposed, the Rule does not address the
-15-

situation where one party believes another isn't being "reasonable." Neither a * u , „ . a
mediator can require a party to take any particular position in a mediation and kuk
101(g) specifies that a party may terminate a mediation "at any time."
The order imposing sanctions was not authorized by any rule or statute and is
inconsistent with the Rule itself. Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion which should
be vacated by this Court.
CONCLUSION
In the trial court there was almost a complete absence of any evidence that Arnold
Rawlings intended to convey his property in trust when he conveyed it by warranty oocd
to Donald and Jeanette Rawlings, and there was complete absence of evidence, as
required by Utah law, that a confidential relation existed between the deed's grantor and
grantees. In the absence of such a relationship, an oral attempt to create an express trust
is barred by the statute of frauds even if the intent to create such a trust can be proven, as
required, by clear and convincing evidence, which was not presented in this case. The
judgment entered below should be reversed.
DATED this 28th day of January, 2008.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

BY W i t w / ^ X c / •
M. David Eckersley
^ —
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings
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THERON LARELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R
MASTERSON,
Third Party and Cross Plaintiffs
vs.
DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
as Trustees of a Trust whose name is
unknown,
Third Party Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated
bench trial pioceedmg on the issue of imposing a constructive trusf Following the presentation of
evidence and by agreement, each of the parties submitted aPost-Trial Memorandum marshaling then
arguments regarding the evidence and the law on the issue. Having considered the parties'
respective memorandums, the evidence presented at trial, and havihg heretofore entered its ruling
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on the bifurcated issue, the Court now makes and enters the fallowing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on the issue of constructive trust:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Arnold J. Rawlings (hereinafter "Arnold") and Cleo Rawlings (hereinafter "Cleo")

had five children who are, in order of birth, Donald Rawlings (hereinafter ''Donald"), Arnold
Dwayne Rawlings (hereinafter "Dwayne"), Theron LaRell Rawlings (hereinafter "LaReLT), Bryce
C. Rawlings (hereinafter "Bryce"), and Carol Lynn Rawlings Mastcrson (hereinafter "Carol").
2.

Arnold Rawlings acquired the property from his mother in 1944, From that time until

the time of his death, his wife Cleo's name was not on the title to the property at issue in this case.
Clco has no ownership interest in the farm property,
3.

Arnold solely owned approximately 22.37 acres of property in Orem. Arnold sold

12 acres, leaving approximately 10.37 acres.
4

Tn 1962 Arnold deeded property roughly adjacentl to Arnold's home to Dwayne

Rawlings and spouse on which they built a home. Tn 1967 a very small piece was deeded to Dwayne
and spouse by Arnold between the property where Arnold's honje was and where Dwayne and
spouse built there home. In 1960 Arnold deeded to Donald and spouse apropeity slightly to the west
of the property deeded to Dwayne. Donald built his home on that broperty. Adjacent to the home
on which Donald btiilthis home, Amolddeeded in 1964 property to Donald which has been referred
to as the barn property, hi 1967 Arnold deeded to Dwayne and spouse two parcels, one south of
Dwayne's home ("the garden") and the other south of the barn property ("the orchard").
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5.

In 1963 the farm was pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a Trust Deed

(Exhibit 8)
6.

in 1964 that indebtedness was rewritten as a Conditional Sales Contract with the

pledge of a Ford trust and an Oldsmobile automobile.
7.

The transaction consisted of a rewriting of the loan with the replacement of security

8.

By October of 1966, Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately

required medical attention.
9.

Prior to December 16, 1966, Donald Rawlings talked to the Welfare Department

about hi s intention to have his father transfer the farm property to him. That intent was conoborated
by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department refemng to a prior meeting, and provides proff
of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt.
10.

On December 22,2006, Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor,

following which he labored to recover from his illness,
11.

in January of 1967, Arnold began a series of 20 cobalt treatments. The medical

attention that Arnold required was extremely expensive. Arnold lacked resources to pay for the
medical treatment and received welfare assistance.
12

Donald Rawlings discussed his intention to transfer Arnold's property into Donald's

name (see Exhibit S, a letter dated December 16, 1966, from the Ui^\ County Department of Public
Welfare to Donald Rawlings).
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13.

The letter from the Welfare Department was addressed to Donald, not to Arnold or

Geo, the persons receiving the benefits from the Welfare Department pertaining to his illness.
14

The Utah County Department of Public Welfare (hereinafter "Welfare Department1')

would pay the majority of themedical expenses associated with Arnold's illness if Arnold's property
was not m his name (other than Arnold's home).
15.

Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital for additional medical treatment on

February 16, 1967. Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital again for yet more medical
treatment on March 14, 1967.
16.

The undisputed testimony is that Arnold's health steadily deteiiorated and he was

in very poor health on March 24,1967. He was somewhat advanced in age. He had an eighth grade
or less education and was very concerned that the trust property would be lost to the Welfare
Department.
17.

Pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated and recorded wi^h the Utah County Recorder on

March 24, 1967, Arnold deeded the property referred to as the farnij property or the trust property to
Donald and spouse. Exhibit 12 is a copy of the deed and a plat of the legal description. Although
Cleo's signature appears thereon, Cleo had no ownership interest in the trust property, and there was
no testimony given as to why she executed any deed that was offered into evidence in this mallei
18.

On March 24,1967, Arnold conveyed by Warranty Deed tliree parcel s to D wayne and

spouse. This deed, with plats as to each of the tliree parcels, was admitted as Exhibits 14, 15, and
16. The undisputed testimony was that parcel I was a small portidn between Arnold's homes and
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Dwayne's home which Arnold had sometime earlier sold to DWayne and spouse. Furthei, the
undisputed testimony was that parcel 2 on Exliibits 14, 15, and 16 has been continuously held by
Dwayne as part of the constructive trust property for and on behalf of the family members to be
distributed as the Court orders.
19.

On March 24,1967, a Quit-Claim Deed (hereinafter ''the sibling deed") was signed

by Dwayne and spouse, LaRell and spouse, Carol, and Bryce and spouse to Donald and spouse. This
sibling deed contained a legal description for the trust property. Ov^r time, small neighboring pieces
of property were added to the trust property in various deeds signed by Donald's siblings and most
sibling spouses.
20

The undi sputed testimony is that the operation of the trust property or the family farm

continued exactly the same before and after March 247 1967, except that, because of Arnold's
weakened physical condition, sometimes he could do very little work. Donald also testified on uoss
examination, when confronted with his deposition testimony, that Although Arnold would go down
to the property and Dwayne, Bryce, and LaRell helped on the property "all 1 (Donald) know is that
I didn't."
21.

On cross examination Donald also admitted, when confronted with his deposition

testimony, that Arnold continued to have property until 1970.
22.

After Arnold's death, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that income

from the trust property was being used to support their mother.
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23.

Both before and after March 24, 1967, and both before and after Arnold's death,

Donald's siblings, sometimes their spouses and sometimes their children, worked in the orchaid o.i
the trust property, the work done after Arnold's death was with the understanding that the income
was to be used to support Geo,
24.

hi 1974, the Vineyard Meadows Subdivision was developed adjacent to the south

boundary line of the trust property (see Exhibit 1) As it was developed, fences were placed in the
backyards of the homes in Vineyard Meadows Subdivision, generally along the south boundary line
of the trust property. Donald told Dwayne that the fences in tfhose backyards encroached upon
"Mother's farm " At Donald's request, and for the purpose of protecting "Mother's farm/' Dwayne
and his son worked with Donald and his son to place a fence though the backyards of the home
owners in that subdivision to show where the boundary line for "Mother's farm" was. Dwayne
regularly attended his Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saintiward with the people who lived in
those homes. He and his spouse were friends with those home owhers. Nevertheless, the undisputed
testimony is, in order to assist in the protection of the family fariti or trust property, Dwayne and his
son placed fencing in those yards Ultimately, the litigation surrounding (he boundary dispute was
resolved. Donald caused some of the funds from the settlements to be delivered to his siblings
(LaRell refused the portion offered to him) and to be used for Cleo's support This included the
purchase of a car,
25.

As pari of this boundary dispute with Vineyard Meadows Subdivision home owneis.

Donald convinced his siblings co^ign another deed in 1974, which he explained to them contained
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a legal description only of the disputed area. The deed named Donald and spouse as grantees, hi
fact, it contained a much larger legal description that included all of the trust property. If, in fact,
Donald and spouse had owned the property before, no such deed would have been necessary.
26.

In April of 1978, Donald and spouse deeded a % interest in a portion of the trust

properly to Dwayne and spouse. This property appears as Exhibit 1 as the Pinegar property. The
Pinegar property was then deeded as part of a 1031 exchange to

and Mrs, Jack Hadley and M L

and Mrs. Merrill Gappmayer. Out of that exchange, Donald and spouse and Dwayne and spouse
were deeded property located on Mountain Way Drive and 400 South in Orem, which was referred
to throughout the Trial as the industrial property. The Pinegar property was credited as a 1/3 down
payment, or $15,000.00 of the $45,000.00 purchase price of the industrial property. The balance of
the purchase price was paid for, $15,000.00 by Donald and spouse and $15,000.00 by Dwayne and
spouse through loans obtained by the respective parties.
27

Donald and Jeanette assert that they paid $579.06 to Walker Bank on December 29,

2966, upon which the bank surrendered its conditional sales contract. (Exhibit 9)
28.

The conditional sales contract was stamped "pai^."

29.

The conditional contract shows that it was a stamped "paid" on December 15,1966

altered by ink to show a date of December 29, 1966.
30

By the terms of the conditional sales constract, the bank's l emedy was a i ecomse to

the automobile company under a full recourse clause.
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31.

In addition, the bank had a security interest in the Ford truck and Oldsmobile which

could have been foreclosed and taken m satisfaction of the remaining debt. Tf a foreclosure of the
trust deed was imminent, the bank would have had to record a Notice of Default and wait 90 days
to for the debtors to cure the default before the Notice of Sale could have been published. No such
recording was ever produced and is not a record in the Utah County Recorder's Office
32.

No evidence was presented that the check for $579.06 was the required loan payoff

amount.
33.

Jcanettc (Donald's spouse) testified that she and Donald had indebtedness with

Walker Bank and Trust Company for the building of their home at the same time period.
34.

In 1966 and 1967, Donald and spouse had loans with the Walker Bank. Commencing

June 29, 1966, Donald and spouse made the following payments, by check, to Walker Bank.

AMOUNT

DATE

|

June 29, 1966

$150 00

July 19,2966

100 00

August 10, 1966

100.00

September 21, 1966

100.00

October 19, 1966

100 00

November 21, 1966

100.00

December 29, 1966

579.06
$1,229.06!

|TOTAL
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35.

Donald and Jeanette5 s banking records offered into evidence dming the trial i evealed

no other payments to Walker Bank during the time frame, in spite of uncontroverted testimony ,f
Jeanette Rawlings, that Donald and spouse had other loans upon which payments would have been
made with Walker Bank and trust during that time frame.
36.

Jeanette also testified that the bank gave her a reconveyance on the trust deed (Exhibit

9) at the same time. Thai testimony, however, is unpersuasive.
37

The deeding ofthe trust property to Donald and Jeanette occurred on March 24,1967,

some three months after the alleged payment ofthe Walker Bank debt by Plaintiffs.
38.

After the litigation commenced, Donald's spouse, Jeannette Rawlings, altered the

checks evidencing the above payments, by adding language on pach of them to indicate they were
paid to Walker Bank and Trust Company for and on behalf of Arnold Rawlings It was only du.mg
the May 97 2005 deposition of Jeannette Rawlings (Donald's spouse) thai she admitted to the
alteration ofthe documentary evidence, by notations made after'this suit was filed, for the purpose
of designating those checks as checks paid on Arnold Rawlings3 account
39

Noting those circumstances, the Court is unpersijadcd that the Plaintiffe9 assei uons

regarding the December 29, 1966, check and concludes the Plaintiffs3 statements are not suppoited
by the records and the evidence.
40.

The Court is unpeisuaded that the fami was deeded by the parties' father to Donald

and Jeanette because of die payment ofthe alleged indebtedness.
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41.

During trial, neither Donald nor Jeancttc testified t}ie reason for the deed was because

they had paid off the loan.
42.

No testimony was presented of any agreement between Donald and his falhei that the

farm was deeded because of payment of the indebtedness.
43.

LaRell Rawlings testified that in late February otj early March that his father had a

conversation with him m which Arnold suggested he needed to| get the property out of Arnold's
name because of the Welfare Department's requirement that it be transferred out of his name.
44.

LaRell suggested il be placed in Dwayne's name £is he would be most fair with the

45.

At a later meeting in Salt Lake City at a restaurant with both Donald and Arnold

family.

present, Arnold indicated that he was going to deed the property to Donald because of the Welfare
requnemenl for receiving assistance.
46.

That conversation (see Pai agraph 45) was in the presence of Donald, was undisputed

by Donald at trial, and remains uncontradicted and unrebntted.
47

No mention was made in that conveisation of any payment of the Walker Bank debt

or any reason for deeding the property because of the Walker Baijik debt.
48

One ox two days before Mary 24,1967, the date the trust property was deeded, Donald

and Arnold met with Dwayne Rawlings and informed him that thdy were deeding the ti usl piopei ty
to Donald because Aniold needed to get the trust piopeity out of his name, consistent with other
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concerns regarding welfare assistance, but no mention was made that such transfer had anything io
do with any payment of the Walker Bank and Trust debt.
49.

No where in this proceeding have Donald or Jeanette testified disputing that the

testimony of Dwayne to the meeting two days before the conveyance of the trust property.
50.

Li January of 1967, Donald told Dwayne that Arnold needed money for taxes on the

trust property, Dwayne borrowed $1,000.00 from the credit union at Geneva Steel and endorsed that
check to Donald for the purpose of making payments on the taxe|s which Donald aheged weie due
on the trust property. Donald did not deliver this $1,000,00 t]o the Utah County Assessor foi
payment of real estate taxes until after the trust property was conveyed to Donald and spouse to hold.
51.

If the March 24, 1967, deed had been intended to transfer ownership to Donald for

the payment of the Walker Bank debt in December of 1966, Arnold would not have been concerned
about paying the back taxes, as it would be Donald's responsibility.
52.

On March 24,1967, Donald and spouse caused $11267,00 ($1,000.00 of which was

paid by Dwayne) to be paid to the Utah County Assessor's Office pn the trust property and on oiher
piopeities owned by Donald and spouse.
53.

It is unrebutted that Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne were all told that the March

24, 1967, conveyance to Donald and spouse was because Arnold had to get the property out of his
name as required by the Welfare Department.
54.

Plaintiffs did not produce any peisuasivc lestimoriy contradicting the testimony of

Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne on that subject.
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55.

There has been inadequate explanation by Donald] and spouse as to why the siblings

and their spouses, with the exception of Carol's husband, were Risked to sign the March 247 1967
Quit-Claim Deed, Exhibit 12.
56.

After March 24,1967, deed, Arnold continued to treat the faun as his own.

57.

Bryce Rawlings testified that his father signed thei March 24, 1967, deed to Donald

and spouse intending only to make it a temporary transfer, withjthe children to receive thcrcaltcr
their expected shares of the farm.
58.

In February of 1970, LaRell was in the military. Arnold asked that the military

release or discharge LaRell early to help on Arnold's farm, the trust property. Tn that regard, the
Court admitted the following into evidence:
a.

Exhibit 22, a letter from Kent Stewart ojf the Utah State Department of

Highways, which stated m part*
"With LaRell's brothers either unable or unwilling to help their father with his farm,
the future would be veiy precarious for him financially .. t in my opinion the only
way Arnold Rawlings could operate his farm is with the full time help of his son,
LaRell
."
b

Exhibit 23, a letter dated February 18, 1976, addressed to the commanding

officer of Dugway Proving Grounds and signed by Darryl M. Williajms, MD. The letter first explains
that Arnold has had a diagnosis of lymphosarcoma and states- "'Mi Rawlings complains of
generalized symptoms that apparently prevent him from carrying <}n his normal work as a farmer "
Doctor Williams goes on the state thai Arnold "does at this present time have evidence of
active disease; the prognosis in this instance must be considered guarded."
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c.

Exhibit 24, a letter from Dr. Watson L. JLaflerty dated Febmary 16, 1970,

states, in part:
"Mr Rawlings has been under my care for one year, fwith a cronic [sic] health
condition and is unable to do his farming. Due to his inability to do the hard labor
which is necessary to operate his farm the need for his son is very urgent."
d.

Exhibit 25 is a letter dated February 16, 1970 and signed by the Honorable

Merrill L. Hemiansen, Third District Juvenile Court, State of Utah- Judge Hermansen explains that
he hecame acquainted with Arnold's medical condition because Aniold and Judge Hcrmmisen were
confined in Utah Valley Hospital at the same time. Judge Hermlanscn goes on to slate:
"I am aware that he is disabled with cancer and that he has as his only means of
support the operation of a small farm also located in the Orem area. His illness
makes it impossible for him to operate this farm, and it is almost his only income,
I would therefore recommend that a hardship discharge be granted to The* "a [sic]
LaRell Rawlings in order that he may take care of this urgent family problem, to wit:
that of the support of his mother and father."
e.

A letter dated February 10, 1970 addressed to the U.S. Army and wnltun to

Leo G. Meredith, manager of Chipman's Mercantile Company in American Fork, Utah

Mi

Meieduh slates:
"[LaRell] and [Arnold],..have operated together in a project of raising fruit, together
with pleasure horses for sale. The Father is working under a handicap of a health
problem to a point where he is unable to do any of the work connected with breaking
and training the horses for sale, nor is he able to do any ofthe heavy work related to
the production ofthe fruit and the sale of thereof."
f

Exhibit 27 is a sworn statement of Glen fyterrill dated Febmary 20, 1970

Therein he states:
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"[Arnold] is unable to take care of his orchard and small I farm. (Arnold] has no one
who is free to help him. He has a single son, LaRell, who lived with his mother and
father and attend to these necessary duties but is now! in the Army stationed at
Dug way, Utah.
"I believe it would be better for all concerned if LaRell could be released to again
look after the welfare of his aging and sick parents. Thi$ is a hardship case."
g.
Exhibit28 is a letter from the Honorable NQall T. Wootlon. Mr, Wootton was
an attorney who practice for many years in Utah County but whopfissed away in 2006. Mr. Wootton
makes the following affirmative representations to the commanding officer of Dugway Proving
Grounds:
(1) He represents Arnold.
(2) Arnold is disabled with cancer.
(3) Arnold's sole source of support is a 104acre farm which he operates.
(4) Without the aid of LaRell, Arnold and Cleo are going to suffer extieme
hardships.
h.

Exhibit 29 is a letter dated January 14, 19J70, from Ray E. Gammon. Mr.

Gammon was a long-time attorney hi Utah County who is now retired. Mr. Gammon makes the
following affirmative representations:
(1) He has known LaRell and his family foil the past several years
(2) LaRell has taken care of the family orchard.
(3) Arnold has been and is receiving treatment for cancer.
(4) Arnold is unable to care for the farm.
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hi addition to doctors, lawyers, a judge, and businessmen, Arnold, himself, executed

not one but two affidavits.
a.

Exhibit 19 is an affidavit executed by Arnold dated February 13,1970. hi the

February 13, 1970 affidavit, Arnold swears:
"that he his engaged as a farmer, Livestock Raiser, and for many years has been
dependenl upon his son, Theron LaRell Rawlings, to assjist him in the operation of
his farm/'
'That the undersigned is 64 years of age and is severely qfflicted with cancer and is
able to do but little of the work required for the operation (f>f his farm, and he is badly
in need of the services of said son to assist him in the planting, cultivating, irrigating,
and harvesting of his crops and in caring for his livestock
b.

Exhibit 20 is Arnold's second affidavit. In| that affidavit Arnold swears that:
(1) He has health pioblems which makes it impossible to do the hard labor

required by the farm
(2) Last fall he lost several hundred bushelsof peai s because he could not get
them picked and to market in time.
(3) That he has three other boys living in \\~ie area, but that he had not been
getting any help from them.
(4) That LaRell had stayed at home and helped since his illness a few years
ago, and that LaRell was the only one he could turn to at that tim0
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The letters referred to in paragraph 57 and tl^e affidavits of Arnold Rawhngs

(paragraph 58) make it clear that the farm was still Arnold's. Thet only purpose for deeding the farm
into Donald's name could have been for protection against the ^elfare Department.
60.

Exhibits 52 and 57 are Arnold's medical records fpr December 1966 through March

1871969. The medical records note that on February 16, 1967, $hortly before the execution of the
deeds which create the constructive trust in this matter, that Arnold was admitted to the hospital
because of his inability to care for himself at home. Arnold had presented mi immediate distress
from an abscessed area of his right grom.
61.

The medical records make it clear that after the December 22,1966 surgery, Arnold

underwent approximately 20 treatments of high energy radiotherapy (cobalt 60) and that the dosage
administered was approximately 400 RAD (TD), They go on to $ay:
"Subsequently, the patient did well until 1967. At thalt time, dunng a routine
followup examination, the patient was noted to nave bi-latcral axillaiy
lymphadenopathy as well as evidence of "chest involverapnt." Because of this, he
was again treated with cobalt therapy at St. Maries Hospital m December 1967."
62.

Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights m the

property.
63.

Arnold also requested and procured help from a n|umber of people supporting his

request to have LaRcll discharged from the military to help him wbrk "his" farm, as referenced by
Exhibits 22, and 24-29,
64.

After the March 24, 1967, deed, Donald did not hel^ in fanning the trust propeity ot

his father
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65.

On March 1, 1971, Arnold Rawlings died.

66.

During all of Arnold's lifetime, all of the income from the trust propeity went to

Arnold. After Arnold's death, Donald consistently representee} to Ins siblings that the income from
the trust property was being used to support their mother.
67.

On March 30, 1971, Cleo Rawlings, his widow, paid the taxes on 8.84 acres, which

included all of the trust property.
68.

Such evidence also supports the factual conclusion that Cleo likewise believed the

farm (the trust property) was the family farm.
69.

Prior to Arnold's death, Bryce Rawlings requested permission from Arnold to put a

trailer on the trust property for a residence. Arnold showed Bryce where on the trust property to
place the trailer, and Bryce lived in the trailer on the farm (the trust property) for four or five years
following his father's death. This evidence supports the conclusion that the parties considered the
farm a family farm.
70

Donald enlisted Dwayne's help to install a fence upon the determined fence line

across the encroaching developed properties of neighboring owners and then negotiated with the title
companies of the subdivided lots settlements for approximately $52,000.00. (See paragi aph 24
above.)
71.

From these proceeds, Donald gave $500 to Carol, $500 to Bryce, and $600 to

Dwayne, with approximately $5,000 for a care and prepayment of burial funds for Cleo. He offered
$500 to LaRell winch LaRell refused.
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72.

Donald testified that the 1974 Quit-Claim Deed was not to convey any interest in the

property from his siblings but was only to clear up the title problem on the south boundary. The
Court is unpersuaded by Donald's testimony.
73.

In 1978 Donald and Jeanette deeded a half interest in the lot known as the Pwegar

Lot to Dwayne and Paulette.
74.

In 1993 Donald traded a property known as the Hellwell property, shown as Exhibit

1, for 6.5 acres in Washington County, Utah. It was only after Dwayne became aware of the
Hellwell trade that Donald or his spouse, for the first time, told any sibling they believed they owned
the trust property, and they were using the funds or income from the trust property in any way they
chose.
75.

The work of all the family members on the farm, except Donald, on the irrigating,

harvesting, and marketing of the fruit, the management of the horses and the proceeds of the fruit
being given to the mother, Cleo, the wailing of so long to take action by the siblings is readily
apparent by the trust thai they had in their older brother (Donald) that he would do what was right,
but by his own actions during the period following the conveyance all demonstrate the farm as a
family faun.
76.

The testimony is undisputed that Donald co-mingled the fluids from the trust property

with his other funds and is unable to distinguish any funds which he spent at any time from March
24, 1967 to the day of trial as to their source whether they came from the trust property income oi
from income from some other source.

19

OCI

CU C-KJKJ I

nuu

77.

w

The evidence in this matter is persuasive and convincing to support the conclusion

that the siblings waited a long period of time, given their trust in their older brother that he would
do what was right for the family, and as buttressed by their own[actions during the peuod following
the conveyance.
78 The Court finds that there is no just reason for jielay of entry of a final judgment
consistent with the findings and conclusions herein.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact by the Court, the Court now makes and enters the
following conclusions of law:
1.

The March 24, 1967, deed from Arnold and Cleo Rawlings to Donald and Jeanette

Rawlings was not for the payment of debt to Walker Bank and Tuist Company or for the payment
of taxes.
2.

The deed transfer was for accommodation and not intended to transfer ownership to

Donald and Jeanette Rawlings
3.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the foregoing findings of fact

establish a equitable need to impose a constructive trust on the property conveyed in the 1967 deeds
and the 1974 deeds
4

The actions regarding the property by Donald and Jeanette are for the benefit of the

trust property.
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5.

From the inception of the trust, Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings received

unjust enrichment of the propeity which they treated as their own wliich included $1,000.00 of the
roughly $1,200.00 taxes that were paid by Dwayne and his spojise, the barn property, the proceeds
from the operation of the trust propeity, and approximately $52,000.00 from negotiated payments
regarding the south boundary fence dispute as well as other benefits from the use and negotiations
relative to the trust property.
6.

The Court concludes that it should enter a final Judgment on the issue that was tried

as to a constructive trust and directs the entry of a judgment onlthe constructive trust issue pursuant
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED and SIGNED this 2 j ? day of August, 200^
BY THE COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

' -.;.\,/<-. .n*t-

M. David Eckersly
ROBINSON, SEILERS, & ANDERSON

JOL^Thomas W. Seiler
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